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1 The first major problem related to the gaps in our existing factual knowledge of the Soviet organ. It seemed to me that this was one of the basic defects in our present intelligence system and I felt that its correction should be very high on our list of priorities. 28 January 1952, 7.2a

2 Attended luncheon and initial stages of discussion with O/ER industrial consultants. The discussion was extremely interesting, since the consultants emphasized the failure of NIEs to indicate the relative volume of facts on which various conclusions were based and also pointed out certain features in which NIEs were incomplete. I spoke to Mr. Dulles about this after the meeting and indicated that the consultants' views accorded entirely with my own, but that I was not entirely sure that O/NE in general fully appreciated the difficulty that everybody seemed to have with these estimates. 1 March 1952, 2 25X1

25X1
3 I attended a meeting in Mr. [] office, at which Dr. [] and [] WSEG raised certain questions as to how best to prepare an intelligence estimate respecting the SAC plan. Dr. Millikan attended this meeting. After some discussion, I expressed the view that before this matter would be ready for the estimators, there appeared to be a Joint Task Force research project required. This might be similar in nature to the one that was headed up by Dr. Millikan in preparation for our conference with the []. It seemed to me to afford an opportunity to try out an operation which might be described as leading to the formation of an Intelligence Research Committee under the jurisdiction of IAC, to coordinate research required for national estimates. This Committee might even take under its wing such functional committees as EIC and SIC, but there were many problems that could not be broken down in functional terms and this one seemed to be of that type. At the conclusion of the meeting, Dr. [] undertook to investigate certain questions with the SIC and get into contact with us within approximately one week. 4 March 1952, 6 25X1

25X1
4 Had an extended discussion with Messrs. Reber, [] and [] respecting the coordination of factual studies in order to furnish more adequate support for national intelligence estimates. At the conclusion of these talks I determined that I shall require someone having the qualifications of [] to spark-plug this program. 8 March 1952, 3 25X1

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Chatted briefly with Dr. Kent respecting the O/NE staff paper on IAC/JIC relationships and made the following points:

a. As respects the fact that IAC is the body to deal with national estimates, I felt there was no confusion in the mind of anybody on that point by now. Most of the trouble has arisen because JIC had not been properly advised as to the implications of the papers they were preparing.

b. There was a refinement overlooked in the O/NE paper, namely, that the JCS planners and others in the military establishment require papers containing much more details and facts than could possibly be included in a national intelligence estimate. Whereas the scope of a JIC paper may be identical with that of an NIE, the subject matter is distinguishable. That is why I suggested to Admiral Johnson that there might well be a combination of effort, rather than an attempt to draw a strict jurisdictional line.

Dr. Kent informed me that his office was preparing a staff paper recommending a subcommittee of IAC to coordinate matters of production. This committee would be chaired by DD/I, and have representation from O/NE and the other CIA production offices and also have representation from production offices of other agencies. I informed Dr. Kent of [] suggestion of a similar body consisting of heads of planning within the respective agencies. Although we discussed this briefly, we reached no conclusions of any kind. Later informed Reber of these various activities, which are all related to his study of the same problem. 8 April 1952, 13

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Spoke briefly with Dr. Kent on the O/NE staff memorandum respecting authentication of facts. I said, in general, that I appreciated the quality of this paper and agreed with it in principle, insofar as it related to the activities of O/NE in preparing National Estimates. One minor point I raised was that sooner or later we would have to have pre mortems rather than post mortems. I took the position, however, that the CIA function of intelligence coordination was not confined to intelligence support for National Estimates and that on that aspect of the job I was not satisfied that O/NE had the answer. I indicated that these were preliminary views and I desired to give this question much more consideration. 16 April 1952, 9

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Inquired of Abbott Smith what had been done by O/NE respecting the request by the NSC Senior Staff to have certain outstanding factual estimates reviewed by the National Intelligence process. He informed me that an appropriate minute appeared in the records of the NSC Senior Staff and believed that the matter of Soviet air OB would be taken up in connection with NIEs 64 and 65. I indicated that there was no need for any further report if this belief were confirmed. 15 August 1952, 13

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8 Reviewed with Mr. Reber a program for planning, about which we are going to talk more at length later. 22 September 1952, 16

9 Mr. Becker briefly reviewed the DD/I organization noting that it now includes OO but that DRC will revert to the operating Offices 30 June. He explained that one of the goals of the DD/I concept is to assess our intelligence production and publications as a whole over and above the particular problems of the individual Offices. He advanced some initial reactions, such as: that our procedure for NIE's and the intelligence production within particular Offices is good, but that we have not yet worked out coordination of the production of intelligence as distinguished from production of individual publications. He added that we are making progress in establishing liaison with the policy agencies, including the NSC Senior Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
5 IAD 1 (11 March)

10 Mr. Becker raised the questions of whether the intelligence offices are doing all that can be done to support national intelligence and whether the offices are doing all they can to assist in planning. He suggested that a committee of Assistant Directors or a task force from their offices be constituted to suggest measures within the agency and in the intelligence community to meet these needs or to make a negative report if the needs are being met. He believes that this should be supported by an over-all appraisal of the total research resources available to the intelligence community. The Assistant Directors agreed to designate representatives to meet with the AD/IC on these problems and consider the following questions:

- a. Is any further co-ordination of research or support of national intelligence required?
- b. Is any additional planning of research for support of national intelligence required?
- c. If the answer to (b.) is yes, what should be done?

Mr. Becker also requested that each office furnish him with a list of the primary problems in which he personally or his staff could be helpful and asked that the AD/IC be kept continuously informed as to matters relating to the relationship of the offices to outside agencies.
6 IAD 2 (1 April)

11 Following the O/SG briefing, the DD/I raised two matters for discussion:

- a. the "personnel ceiling" matter, as approved by the DCI, 6 May;
- b. authentication of facts and related questions.

As to the latter, attention was called to the O/NE "Program of Estimates for the Remainder of 1952, "dated 5 May 1952. Mr. Becker undertook to circulate for comment a memorandum respecting the various staff studies on "facts," together with the available studies. The IAD's undertook to consider, as Office problem, the questions of auditing and planning intelligence production. 8 IAD 2 (7 May)

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The DD/I announced that members of the NSC Secretariat have emphasized the high quality of the intelligence contributions to NSC 135. This intelligence progress report was prepared on the basis of contributions from the IADs and IAC agencies. Mr. Becker requested that all those who participated in this exercise be commended.

It was brought out that study of the over-all intelligence progress report would highlight certain long-term primary problems. It was recognized that there would always be a sizeable number of daily "flaps," but that these primary problems demanded continuous study, and that at any given time the success with which they are met would determine our over-all intelligence position.

One such problem is that of intelligence production planning. The DD/I referred to the staff studies exchanged earlier in the year on this subject, and pointed out that he had purposely not written a memorandum to AD/NE on this subject, as promised, because of certain developments including the post-mortem technique, the NIE clean-up sessions and the deliberations of the ad hoc Committee on Scientific and Technical Intelligence. These had shown that many intelligence production problems are best attacked by an ad hoc approach. DD/I stated, however, that there remained certain problems on which progress could be best made by an officer freed of administrative duties and thus able to raise and devote thought to planning problems.

It was the sense of the meeting that the experience with NIE-64 has demonstrated that the proposed annual intelligence program is sound; in this connection, two commitments are outstanding, namely: the NSC has been told that the next such estimate will be timely for budget purposes; the R&DB has been informed that much of its needs will be met by our annual program. 16 IAD 1 (15 September)

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